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Kenneth P. Jameson
In  his keynote to  the IM F-sponsored “C onference  on  Second G en era tio n  R eform s,” 
then-p residen t o f  the W orld  B ank  Jam es W olfensohn  said, “T he  second genera tion  
issues focus a round  th e  questions o f  the  struc tu re  o f  th e  righ t in stitu tions, o f  the 
im provem ent o f the adm inistrative, legal, and regulatory functions o f  the state, address­
ing th e  incentives and actions th a t are required  to  have private sector developm ent and 
to develop th e  in s titu tio n a l capacity fo r reform s.” H is focus o n  in s titu tions found  reso­
nance in  the W orld  D evelopm ent R eport, 2002, entitled  “B uilding In s titu tions for M ar­
kets,” and reflected Jeffrey N u g en t’s (1998, 8) calculation  th a t th e  in s titu tio n a l co n ten t 
o f th e  Journal of Development Economics increased from  15 p ercen t to  27 p ercen t after the 
1970s, w hile th a t in  th e  Handbook of Development Economics rose from  7.5 p ercen t to  36 
p ercen t from  th e  second to  th e  th ird  volum e. T h is provides evidence th a t 
in stitu tionalism  has indeed w on th e  developm ent debate  and Philip K lein’s 1977 state­
m en t is again true: “[I]n th e  field o f developm ent econom ics the victory [of 
institu tionalism ] has been  so com plete th a t m any econom ists fail to  realize it” (785).
K lein was referring  to “o ld ” institu tionalism , roo ted  in  V eblen , C o m m o n s, and 
Ayres, in  w hich th e  econom y is a system th a t “em braces a body o f  know ledge and  o f 
skills and a stock  o f physical equ ipm en t; it also em braces a com plex netw ork  o f personal 
re la tions reinforced  by custom , ritual, sen tim en t, and  dogm a” (1977, 789). T h is is cer­
tainly n o t the in s titu tiona lism  o f  the W orld  B ank, w hich privileges “in s titu tio n s for 
m arkets” and  explicitly states th a t “the recogn ition  o f th e  crucial ro le o f  in s titu tions, 
organizations, and  political econom y restric tions is n o t ta n ta m o u n t to  a re jec tion  o f the 
neoclassical m odel” (IBRD  1998, xi). O n e  in s titu tio n , th e  m arket, rem ains the focus o f 
the in te rn a tio n a l financial in s titu tio n s such as the  W orld  B ank.
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Nonetheless, institutionalism  has again become central to developm ent thinking, 
accompanied by an appreciation of the variety and complexity of institutional evolu­
tion. The result is no t the “old institutionalism ” of T horstein Veblen and Clarence 
Ayres or the “new institutionalism ” of the early Douglass N orth. R ather it is a pragmatic 
com bination of the constructs and approaches of the form er with the epistemological 
and m ethodological advances of the latter, all brought to bear on the many Issues of 
development. The challenges of the developm ent process, and its resistance to 
reductionism , are the roots of m odern institutionalism ’s contribution  to understanding 
both  developm ent and the policies and processes tha t can guide developm ent initia­
tives. I will term  the current com bination the “m odern institutionalism  of 
developm ent.”
The "New" New Institutional Economics (NNIE)
N orth  (2000, 491) reflects the evolution quite well. W hile he still holds tha t “we 
know the econom ic and the institutional conditions tha t make for good econom ic per­
form ance,” he no longer reduces tha t to the expansion of markets. Rather he calls for “a 
clear understanding of the new institutional economics,” developm ent of “a body of 
political-economic theory,” and “a better understanding of the social norm s and infor­
mal constraints” th a t affect perform ance. A n “old” institutionalist could rightly suggest 
tha t tha t tradition  provides a wealth of literature and m ethodological insights tha t 
should be part of this effort.
N orth  (2005) has attem pted to m eet his own challenge by developing a com prehen­
sive approach to econom ic change. In doing so, he discards the neoclassical model and 
substitutes institutionalist categories: beliefs and culture displace rationality, the imper­
ative for understanding dom inates maximization, and path dependence characterizes 
historical processes rather than  an ahistoric continuity. This allows him  to develop a set 
of constructs tha t he fruitfully applies to a variety of historical experiences, from the 
Spanish colonization process to the demise of the Soviet U nion. His NNIE conclusion 
is tha t “[w]hile formal institutions can be changed by fiat, inform al institutions evolve in 
ways tha t are still far from completely understood and therefore are n o t typically am ena­
ble to deliberate hum an m anipulation” (50). This moves him  far beyond the IFI belief 
in m arket institutions and com m itm ent to im planting them  into all societies under 
their sway.
Similar evolution is found in two other strains of NNIE. The “historical and com­
parative institutional analysis” (HCIA) school starts from the premise tha t there are 
m ultiple institutional equilibrium s possible and therefore the historical outcom e is path 
dependent. The actual institutions depend on historical conditions and cultural beliefs, 
and m arket institutions are only one possibility. Their case studies docum ent many 
other institutional forms tha t have developed as societies confront econom ic issues 
(Oreif 2000).
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Finally, the “m icrofoundations of institutional arrangem ents” (Bardhan 2000) is 
based on  imperfect or asymmetric inform ation and the institutions th a t have evolved to 
deal with this reality. The early work of Joseph Stiglitz and Pranab Bardhan aimed to 
explain odd institutional arrangem ents such as share cropping and large inefficient 
landholdings. M ore recently it has been used to  show tha t the popular property rights 
explanations of successful economic developm ent are misleading and tha t o ther institu­
tional mechanisms have been widely adopted, often with some success. Thus, once 
again the simple focus on creating the conditions for free markets to function is 
marginalized as a sufficient or even necessary condition for development. M uch more 
im portant are the particular institutions th a t different societies have developed in  the 
course of their history and the role they play in facilitating development.
The more recent B ardhan (2005) acts as a bridge between the NNIE and m odern 
institutionalism  of developm ent (MID). His m ethodology is quite mainstream, with 
complex micro-based modeling of a variety of phenom ena. O n  the o ther hand, his pur­
view is far broader than  the mainstream fixation on  the market. He examines the inter­
action of the private sphere, the government, and the com munity, and he brings acute 
empirical scrutiny to  experiences o f collective action, distributive conflicts, accountabil­
ity, and cooperative action. His rejection of “m arket primacy,” com bined with his m eth­
odology, make him  an im portant figure in  the emergence o f a m odern institutionalist 
understanding o f many o f the central elements in  development.
W hile the NNIE has a different starting po in t from old institutionalism , it finally 
arrives at very similar positions: culture and beliefs m atter; there are varieties o f institu­
tions th a t can be adopted; there is path dependence in institutional development; full 
understanding requires a theory of institutional change; and historical case studies are 
central to developing this understanding. New developments in the old institutionalist 
framework have converged with the NNIE, and to th a t we turn.
The "New" Old Institutional Economics (NOIE)
There are three institutionalist currents in developm ent tha t em anate from old 
institutionalism  rather than  N IE. The first is a return  to the old roots of institutionalism  
as a resource for understanding contem porary developm ent and its failures. The Journal 
of Economic Issues is the most com m on outlet for this work. Several examples can illus­
trate. John  Adams and Hans-Peter B runner (2003) used Ayres’ treatm ent o f technology 
to examine the failure o f a telecom m unications project in Nepal and suggested th a t sen­
sitivity to the cerem onial factors tha t can lead to resistance could have avoided many of 
its problems. P. Sai-Wing H o and Geoffrey Schneider (2002) mobilized G unnar 
Myrdal’s concepts of backwash/ spread effects and cumulative causation to analyze 
South Africa’s path since the end of apartheid and to  suggest alternative policies. 
Finally, Michael Stettler (2002) returned to  John R. C om m ons’ treatm ent o f the em er­
gence of rules and order to analyze disorder in the Maasai territory resulting from the
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im plem entation o f private property rights. These and similar studies often update the 
analytical framework; however, they suggest tha t many of the issues faced in develop­
m ent have n o t changed fundam entally since the origins of old institutionalism . Their 
approach reasserts the value of OIE, and the novelty is in applying it to issues th a t other 
traditions ignore or cannot address.
The second strain in  N O IE grows ou t o f the institutionalist critique of mainstream 
economics, a critique tha t James Peach (200.3, 1.31) sees as an institu tion  in  its own right 
and tha t “may contribute to  reaching [beyond] the [m ainstream ’s] threshold of resis­
tance to change.” Ha-Joon C hang (200.3) best exemplifies the new critique. Elements of 
his position are familiar, namely, highlighting the im portance of institutions beyond 
the m arket to  the functioning o f the economy and society. However, his historical treat­
ments o f the developm ent o f capitalism and his critique of the reigning neoliberal main­
stream are clearly directed to  the contem porary mainstream, including the NIE. He 
docum ents the “unholy alliance” of neoclassical economics’ treatm ent o f m arket failure 
with the Austrian-Libertarian belief tha t any intervention m ust be suppressed. He offers 
an institutionalist political economy th a t finds institutions and political decisions at the 
core of the economy; for example, the m arket is an institutional and political creation. 
His critique is buttressed by case studies o f institutional evolution in  the developm ent 
process, for example, in  South Korea (Chang and Evans 2005) and leads to  suggestions 
for alternative developm ent policies (Chang and G rabel 2004). All o f these elements are 
necessary building blocks for an institutionalism  th a t can begin to pass the main­
stream ’s threshold of resistance, weakened as it is by developm ent failures and the NIE 
wedge. O ne other new approach supports the effort.
Geoffrey Hodgson (2004, 2005) provides the final elem ent tha t may ensure 
institutionalism ’s continued dom inance in  issues of development. He specifies the 
epistemological basis o f a m odern institutional program. He returns to the origins of 
institutionalism  and highlights the approach to knowledge tha t existed at tha t time. In  
psychology, it was based in instinct theory. In  addition, and especially with Veblen, it 
was evolutionary. A nd philosophically, its source was the pragmatism of John  Dewey. In 
the attack on  institutionalism  tha t was so effective in  the post-war, these were replaced 
by behaviorism, an ahistorical mechanical model, and logical positivism. Hodgson 
(2004) makes a strong case th a t psychology has moved back toward an instinct theory, 
tha t an evolutionary perspective and “em ergentism ” are becoming accepted as better 
explanations of complex social systems, and th a t logical positivism is being replaced by 
pragmatism. Each o f these has taken on m odern characteristics growing ou t o f m ethod­
ological and empirical advances in  recent decades. Nonetheless, the core psychological 
and philosophical basis of old institutionalism  has returned to  prom inence in  social sci­
ence. For H odgson (2005, 95) there are two implications for development. First, the 
inform al nature of institutions shows tha t their creation cannot be by governm ent 
decree, and so developm ent requires changes in  individual mentalities as well as social 
relations. Second, for developm ent to occur there m ust be a com bination o f spontane­
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ous institutional form ation and conscious institutional design. His conclusion is 
remarkably similar to N o rth ’s (2005).
The contributions of NNIE and NOIE have provided a basis for the MID, to which 
I now turn.
Modern Institutionalism of Development
The sheer complexity of the developm ent process lies at the root of the convergence 
of NNIE and N O IE to MID. N either of the older traditions succeeded in solving the 
developm ent challenge. This provides a needed caution to MID, lest its victory be pyr­
rhic. It m ust com bine the new appreciation of the centrality of institutions in  develop­
m ent with the most useful elements of the two institutional economics. W hat should 
guide MID as its practitioners engage the perennial issues of development?
• The urge to reductionism should be resisted, accompanied by acceptance of a 
wide range of possible definitions of development, institutional structures that 
can characterize a society, and historical processes that may move development 
ahead.
• The hum an dimensions to development must always be kept in  the forefront, and 
policies that sacrifice the welfare of some for some future benefit, for example, the 
increase in  inequality necessary to allow markets to function widely, should be 
resisted. These changes often become institutionalized.
• Efforts to create and foster responsive institutions that build upon  participants’ 
understanding and definitions should be encouraged and supported. For 
example, the creation of indigenous movements and structures in  many Latin 
American countries has the potential to transform the historical development 
path in  countries with large indigenous populations.
• “Local knowledge” should become part of any development process and should 
take precedence over the im position of some blueprint for development (Rodrik 
2001). For that is more likely to bring about the required com bination of 
institutional development and change in mentality that can encourage 
development.
• Local, national, and international institutional factors all affect development, 
and institutional evolution must be congruent at these levels to be successful. 
W hen this is no t the case, resistance to potentially beneficial changes causes 
disruption and loss of benefits. A n example of incongruence comes from the 
indigenous mobilization across Latin America to oppose free trade agreements 
and extension of intellectual property right protections to m ultinational 
corporations. A n example of congruence is the growth of micro-credit lending, 
supported by international willingness to subsidize credit to poor persons rather 
than  discounting it based on “m arket perform ance criteria.”
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Conclusion
Institutionalism  has won the developm ent debate. However, this does no t ensure 
that successful developm ent will occur in coming decades. This is no surprise for 
institutionalist developm ent economists who never succumbed to the naive optimism 
of the “unholy alliance” of m arket fundam entalism .
In an article on  historians’ growing appreciation of the centrality o f institutions in 
Latin American development, John C oatsw orth’s (2005, 144) description of contem po­
rary Latin America captures this ambiguity well.
Perhaps the region is witnessing not so much the collapse of the W ashington 
Consensus as the slow-motion disintegration of the political economy that 
emerged at the end of the nineteenth  cen tu ry .. . .  New systems of political and 
economic power seldom emerge from straight lines on a legible map, so scholars 
as well as policy makers and economic actors may find it convenient to not only 
follow developments with a healthy skepticism, but also to raise their tolerance 
for political, social, and even economic experim entation in coming years.
So the challenge will be to utilize creatively the insights of N N IE—a nascent theory 
of change, acceptance of the role of history and culture in institutional development, 
and careful micro analysis of the interaction of the private, government, and com m u­
nity spheres—in com bination with those of N O IE —novel uses of the institutionalist tra­
dition, policy developm ent growing out of the critique of m arket fundam entalism , and 
firm grounding in contem porary psychology and philosophy. W inning the develop­
m ent debate will indeed be a pyrrhic victory unless M ID contributes to improved devel­
opm ent perform ance and to improvements in hum an welfare.
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